The Bottom Billion

            Paul Collier, the director of the Center for the Study of African Economics at Oxford, takes an unprecedented twist on the ‘white man’s burden’ in his book The Bottom Billion. He does not target the sentiments by rendering Africa hopeless and victimized, nor does he claim that their setbacks are simply their mistakes. He takes a nuanced approach: “change in the societies at the very bottom must come predominantly from within,” (xi) and industrial nations must strengthen their efforts. Collier holds the opinion of many other development specialists: aid agencies aren’t exactly doing their job. They are focusing on middle-income countries. For example, The World Bank doesn’t even have a single staff member in the Central African Republic, so they are neglecting those who actually need their help. The world has fallen into mayhem over the Chinese stealing intellectual property, but no one has heard of anyone entering crisis mode over Chad. The conception of the developing world is backdated a few decades, and, as Collier claims, the bottom five billion do not need our help. They are doing just fine; it is the bottom billion that are falling apart.

            Collier points to four traps that make the bottom billion the bottom billion. The first is the conflict trap; if a country has low per capita income, they are more likely to fall into civil war and “the lower a country’s income at the onset of conflict, the longer the conflict lasts” (26). Collier emphasizes a vicious cycle: if countries anticipate civil war, economic decline occurs, and once one civil war occurs, countries are much more vulnerable to future wars. The second trap Collier presents is the natural resource trap. Dependence on natural resources prevents a normal economy from forming and results in what Collier deems “survival of the fattest.” The natural resource trap is accentuated by being landlocked (trap number three), as many Sub-Saharan African countries are. Here we have another cycle. There is less inherent capability by living in the middle of a desert, so countries are doomed to rely on natural resources. The final trap is surprisingly given the same substance as the previous one: the trap of bad governance. When a country is not developed and receives aid, “government must transform its money into public services” (66); welcome to yet another vicious cycle.

            Well how do these cycles end? Many development specialists think Western countries determine the fate of the bottom billion, but Collier targets a different geographical area: Asia. While China is a hot debate topic in the 2012 election, Collier suggests it is those receiving austerity and toughness that are important to development. Asia benefited from an earlier boost of globalization. Now the rest have to wait “until development in Asia creates a wage gap…similar to the gap…between Asia and the rich world around 1980” (86).

            Don’t worry, Collier doesn’t say Asian price gaps are the answer. He goes on to explain how industrialized nations can change their current help mechanisms to actually work. Intuitive changes need to occur to fit countries in traps; conditionality must happen. He presents the time consistency problem, specifying an inherently broad concept. To prevent problems we must invest in projects. To turn around states, we must ensure political opportunity, and to sustain growth in post-conflict situations, we must provide long-term financial aid. Aid cannot be solitarily determined by quality of the government or reputation of the state. It must be time consistent.

            Collier presents the conception of laws and charters next, but they seem to go hand-in-hand with aid. Aid must ensure it will increase investment to indicate growth, so international charters need to be made for this reassurance. Collier specifies charters for different circumstances, but it can be put pretty simply: transparency. Transparent auction, payments, spending, and budgeting are necessary for charters to work. Investment charters must be a long-term commitment and apply to both domestic and foreign governments. The Westerners aren’t coming to the rescue any more; domestic governments must take responsibility. Collier emphasizes that “the whole point of an investment charter is for newly reforming governments” (155), so support must be given to rebels while still holding them accountable.

            Collier presents another cycle: trade policy. Rich countries have subsidies and escalated tariffs while undeveloped countries are protected. With liberalized trade, countries need to diversify their exports, which is made possible when using aid on import supply. To make this feasible, the bottom billion “need temporary protection from Asia” (167) to pay lower tariffs and generous rules of origin.

            All trapped countries will continue their struggle and each need to be catered to specifically by Collier’s varied solutions. Instead of the aid argument that is hyped up by many economists, Collier presents the concept of laws and charters to be more crucial. Nigeria or Angola cannot be forced to take aid and invest it well, but by presenting them with laws and charters, they will be given the groundwork for reform that is not subject entirely to neopatrimonial states.

            Collier’s emphasis on precedents set internationally, protection by Asia, and poignant references to individual country’s success and failures-“less than 1 percent of [money intended for rural health clinics in Chad] reached the clinics” (66)-creates an enticing and convicting read. He is informative yet unique in his approach, but his solutions raise a couple of hesitations. First, his solutions harp on how the G8 must reconsider aid strategies to help reformers, but then he switches to focus on Asia as the most important actor. The majority of his book focuses on the traps countries are in and the measures that need to be taken by Western, industrialized countries and the bottom billion themselves. However, towards the end he throws in that Asia is the place these countries need to turn to. If both are needed, Collier then becomes hypocritical. If the bottom billion need support from Eastern and Western hemispheres and they need international laws and charters, shouldn’t there be some between the US and Asia in the first place? Collier claims the bottom billion must be held accountable in their domestic and international spheres, but how can they be expected to do that if both domestic political parties are debating which one can be tougher on China? This has to do mostly with US-China relations, but if we don’t enter into cohesive charters with Asia, we cannot expect underdeveloped countries to do so. This being said, if Collier redefines the notion of rich countries from Europe and the US to include Asian markets (specifically the ones benefiting from globalization), his argument becomes much stronger. At the end of every section he states what his argument implies for the G8, but China isn’t in the G8 (Japan is the only Asian country). Once more of Asia is considered, the coordination of rich countries and aid agencies within themselves and between each other will have much larger implications. Collier is correct that reform must come from within, but unless reform is properly facilitated, and “we” is redefined to mean the West and Asia, their struggle will prove indefinite.

           

Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.